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Abstract
Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys, we study the impact of scal
decentralisation in Indonesia on local public spending across communities characterised
by di¤erent types of informal and formal institutions. Our results provide new evi-
dence that scal decentralisation led to a signicant increase in community spending
on social infrastructure (health and education) in communities which observed strict
adherence to customary laws and had a tradition of local democracy. We argue that
investment in transport and communication facilitates exchange with outsiders and
improves the outside options of community members, thus making it more di¢ cult to
sustain intra-community cooperation. Consequently, communities which enjoy a high
level of cooperation in collective activities benet less from investing in transport and
communication and are more inclined to invest in social infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the potential of improving public service delivery in developing countries
through political and scal decentralisation has received a great deal of attention, both
from policy institutions and within the academic literature (World Bank 2004; Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2006). Decentralisation, it has been argued, can be an e¤ective tool in ensuring
the quality of public service delivery because local government have greater accountability
to the population and better information about the needs of the community.
However, there are potential problems relating to the decentralised provision of public
services: public investments at the community level can have spillovers outside of the com-
munity that are not taken into account by local government; and the local elite can capture
and divert public spending for their own needs (Bardhan, 2002).
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Since scal decentralisation provides greater decision-making power to local governments,
its impact on public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the quality and nature of
local institutions (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). For example, Beard (2007) nds that
community development e¤orts in Indonesia are driven by the principle of reciprocity, with
participants contributing in order to receive benets. Therefore, household integration in
social networks is a strong predictor of their contribution to community development e¤orts.
Decentralisation can, therefore, lead to di¤erent outcomes if democracy and mutual cooper-
ation are practised at the local level compared to situations where power is concentrated in
the hands of the local elite. The question as to whether and how local institutions mediate
the e¤ects of scal decentralisation has received limited attention in the literature.
This paper attempts to bring both theoretical insights and empirical evidence to this
under-researched topic. We develop a theoretical model to derive the optimal choice of
public goods across communities which di¤er in terms of their adherence to traditional laws.
These laws prescribe how each community member should contribute to collective activities
as well as the punishment for falling short of these prescriptions. We argue that public goods
which facilitate communication and exchange with outsiders (such as roads, public transport,
telephone facilities, etc.) will improve the outside options of community members and, thus,
make it more di¢ cult to enforce community-level punishments prescribed by traditional laws.
Therefore, the higher the existing level of participation in collective acitvities and adherance
to traditional laws, ceteris paribus, the less incentive the community has in investing in such
infrastructure.
Taking the theory as a benchmark, we examine the impact of scal decentralisation in
Indonesia, which came into e¤ect in 2001, on public spending at the community level.1
The decentralisation laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 (subsequently revised in laws 32/2004 and
33/2004) devolved control over spending on public goods from the central government to
lower level administrative authorities and gave them full autonomy to decide how to spend
the funds provided by the central government. Traditional institutions have, historically,
played an important role in community life in Indonesia, up to and during the colonial
period. The inuence of these institutions weakened following independence, under the
Suharto administration, but arguably, experienced a resurgence after Suharto left power
(Davidson and Henley, 2007). Today, there is considerable variation in the extent to which
communities adhere to traditional rules when undertaking collective projects, deciding upon
the village leader, etc.
The Indonesian Family Life Surveys (IFLS) provide information on adherence to tradi-
tional law, as well as investment spending on di¤erent public goods at the community level.
We use the 1997 and 2007 rounds of the IFLS to estimate the e¤ect of scal decentralisation
1We use the term communityto refer to both rural villages (desa) and urban communities (kelurahan)
in Indonesia.
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on public spending at the community level, and investigate whether the e¤ects on spending
di¤ered across villages with di¤erent levels of adherence to traditional law, within the same
district. We take the share of the central governments direct contribution in a communitys
public spending budget as a measure of centralised scal control for that community. This
share declined, broadly, across Indonesian communities following decentralisation but it fell
by less in geographically larger communities and communities which were more distant from
the district headquarters, the administrative level to which scal decisions were devolved. We
exploit this variation to estimate the impact of scal decentralisation on local public spend-
ing. The two rounds of data enable us to control for time-invariant district characteristics
as well as time-varying characteristics at the district-level.
Our estimates indicate that scal decentralisation had led to a decline in investments as a
share of total public spending in communities that had a tradition of democracy or observed
strict adherence to customary laws. However, communities which had both a tradition of
democracy and adhered to customary laws experienced a sharp increase in investments which
more than o¤sets the decline noted above. For the latter communities, we also nd that
decentralisation led to a shift in public spending towards investment in social goods, with
no change in the share going into investments in communications and road infrastructure,
which provides partial support for the theory.
The existing empirical literature has analysed the e¤ects of decentralisation on public pol-
icy using, predominantly, cross-country data (see, for example, Davoodi and Zou (1998), De
Luca et al. (2002), De Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fishman and Gatti (2002)). Enikolopov
and Zhuravskaya (2007) use cross-section and panel data from about 75 developing and tran-
sition countries to argue that decentralisation works better with strong national parties that
allow local leaders to be chosen locally, rather than when the national parties are weak and,
to avoid political competition, these weaker parties appoint local leaders as administrative
subordinates. This approach, however, is not ideal, as pointed out by the authors, since there
are di¤erent strata of sub-national regions, and public policy decisions may be decentralised
to di¤erent levels.
Hence, it is important to focus on sub-national regions as the unit of analysis when in-
vestigating the e¤ects of scal decentralisation. There are a limited, but growing, number
of studies that have focused on the political economy of public goods provision at the local
level. Besley, Pande and Rao (2005, 2007) use data from a survey conducted in 2002 in
southern India to consider the e¤ects of attending community meetings and the character-
istics of community leaders on access to public goods in a community. The authors use
inter-village variation in the key explanatory variables (participation in village meetings or
leaders characteristics) to identify the causal e¤ect of various political economy variables on
access to public goods. Along similar lines, Bandeira and Levy (2010) use the 1997 Indone-
sian Family Life Survey to exploit cross-village variation in public nance, governance and
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ethnic composition to identify a causal e¤ect of ethnic diversity and governance on public
goods provision. Further, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2012) and Padro-i-Miguel et al. (2013)
investigate the e¤ect of the introduction of village-level elections on the provision of public
goods provision in rural China. Martinez-Bravo et al. (2012) nds that the elections in-
creased local accountability and Padro-i-Miguel et al. (2013) nd that the e¤ects were larger
in villages with greater religious homogeneity.
A number of recent papers have also looked at the e¤ects of scal decentralisation and
related changes on the provision of public goods in Indonesia. For example, Lewis and
Osterman (2014) investigate the e¤ects of intergovernmental transfers on capital spending
at the district-level over the period 2003-2009 using a GMM approach. Kis-Katos and
Sjahrir (2014), also nds that expenditure decentralisation led to increased investment in
public infrastructure at the district-level, with larger e¤ects in districts which initially had
lower levels of infrastructure.
A related literature looks at e¤ects of Indonesias democratisation and political decen-
tralisation on a range of government outcomes. Martinez-Bravo (2014) uses the rst round
of democratic elections in Indonesia following political decentralisation to investigate how
the method of selection of village heads appointment or election a¤ects electoral out-
comes across villages. She nds that the alignment of electoral results at the village- and
district-levels is greater for villages with appointed heads as opposed to elected heads, and
argues that appointed heads have greater incentive to exert e¤ort or manipulate village-level
electoral outcomes to signal their political alignment with higher-level authorities. A num-
ber of other studies have made use of the exogenous variation in the timing of introduction
of direct elections at the district-level to study the e¤ects of democratisationon various
outcomes. Skouas et al. (2011) and Kis-Katos and Sjahrir (2014, cited above) look at
how the composition of public expenditures changed as a result of the introduction of direct
elections. Valsechhi (2013) nds that the incidence of corruption increased after the intro-
duction of direct elections, while Mukherjee (2014) nds that the switch from appointments
to direct elections at the district level increased the extent of redistributive policies, including
transfers to poor households from social protection programmes.
We are not aware of any research in the literature that explicitly examines the impact
of scal decentralisation across communities with di¤erent types of local institutions, in
Indonesia or elsewhere. This is the main contribution of our paper.
The composition of public spending and public goods has become the key instrument for
policies for economic development (IMF and World Bank 2003). In recent years, develop-
ment assistance to heavily indebted poor countries has been made conditional on increase
on certain categories of public spending that are thought to be pro-poor. In particular, com-
ponents of public spending aimed at reducing poverty levels focuses on education, health,
agriculture, safety nets, infrastructure, rural development and others (IMF and World Bank
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2003). This practice has its roots in the works of Aschauer (1989), Barro (1991), Easterly
and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan et al. (1996). Aschauer (1989) argued that investment in
core infrastructure like streets, railways, airports has the most explanatory power for private
sector productivity in the United States. Along similar lines Easterly and Rebelo (1993)
suggested that public investment in infrastructure boosts economic growth. Barro (1991)
further argued that productive spending on education (which develops human capital) and
defence (which protects property rights) are growth enhancing. In this respect, a distinction
is often made between social and physical infrastructural goods. While investment in physical
(e.g., transport and communications) infrastructure will facilitate production of both goods
and services, investment in health and education will contribute to healthy and educated
workers, and thereby improve labour productivity.
Most existing studies nd positive growth e¤ects of transport, communications, health
and education alike, an important exception being Devarajan et al. (1996). Devrajan et
al. (1996) examined the growth e¤ects of the composition of public spending for economic
growth in the developing regions and surprisingly found that unlike the OECD region, the
current spending has positive growth e¤ect while capital spending (on transport, commu-
nication, health, education etc) has negative growth e¤ects. The latter can be attributed
to the possibility that public expenditures in developing-country governments have been bi-
ased excessively towards capital expenditures at the expense of current expenditures, thus
reducing the rate of return on capital investments.
We contribute to this literature by highlighting and investigating an important character-
istic of capital investments that improve access to external markets for remote communities.
By improving the outside options of community members, such investments can weaken the
functioning of informal institutions that rely on the threat of social exclusion, and therefore
local authorities can potentially be reluctant to make such investments. This reasoning has
been implicit in the literature on the functioning of informal institutions, discussed in Section
3.1.
The paper is developed as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of scal de-
centralisation and community-level institutions in Indonesia. In Section 3.1, we discuss the
theoretical literature which provides a starting point for our model on local public goods
expenditures. The model is presented in section 3.2, and the optimal choice of public invest-
ments are derived in section 3.4. The econometric model and the indentication strategy are
discussed in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 provides a description of the data. The
econometric results are discussed in Section 7. Our conclusions are presented in Section 8.
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2 Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Institutions in In-
donesia
2.1 Fiscal Decentralisation
In 1999, the Indonesian government passed two laws, namely Law 22/1999 and 25/1999,
which stipulated that scal authority and responsibility for a large number of public services
would be granted to provincial (provinci) and district (kabupaten/kotamadya) governments.
The decentralisation laws were passed by the new president Habibie, following a thirty-year
period of highly centralised scal control that characterised Suhartos regime (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006; Kis-Katos and Sjahrir 2014).
According to laws 22/1999 and 25/1999, the central government would retain respon-
sibility in just ve areas: national security, foreign policy, monetary policy, nance and
development planning, justice and law enforcement. All other public services, including the
health, education and infrastructure, would become the responsiblity of district and village
(desa/kelurahan) governments, with a more minor role being granted to provincial govern-
ments (Brodjonegoro, 2001; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).
Despite the shift in the responsibility for providing public services, the task of revenue
collection remained primarily in the hands of the central government. To ensure that the
lower-level authorities had su¢ cient resources to undertake their new responsibilities, a new
system of intergovernmental funds transfer was introduced through the decentralisation laws.
The most important component of this system was a general allocationgrant provided to
provincial and district-level governments according to a scal needsformula.2 Under Law
25/1999, the provincial, district and village government authorities would have freedom to
decide how to spend the funds provided by the central government (Brodjonegoro 2001).
These changes also led to a dramatic shift in the sources of revenues for village govern-
ments. Data from the village nance module in the IFLS shows a substantial increase in the
share of revenues that came from the district-level government and a corresponding decline
in the share of revenues from the central government, between 1997 and 2007 (see Table 1).
In 1997, on average, nearly a third of the revenue came from direct grants made by the cen-
tral government in Jakarta. In 2007, the central governments average contribution in village
budgets had fallen to 6.6% . By contrast, the average contribution from the district-level
government had risen from 9% to 41% between 1997 and 2007. The share of total revenues
generated within the village itself remained roughly unchanged between 1997 and 2007.
2The district governments received grants from the central government for a General Allocation Fund
according to the following scal needsformula (Brodjonegoro 2001):
Central Govt. Grant = average local expenditure 
1
4 [population index + area index + construction price index + poverty index]
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Thus, the creation of the general allocation grant signicantly increased the role of
district-level government in public spending decisions at the village level. It stands in con-
trast with various grants provided by the central government during the New Order Regime
that were generally earmarked for specic uses. For example, in the early 1970s, the gov-
ernment set up the autonomous regional subsidy (SDO) scheme, to cover the cost of paying
regional government employees; and the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) scheme which pro-
vided grants directed, in part, towards particular uses specied by the central government
(Resosudarmo and Vidyattama 2007).
It is important to note that the decentralisation laws did not specify any discretionary
funds to be made available directly to village level governments. However, it is possible that
the scal decentralisation process expanded the role of village government in local public
spending to the extent that they were able to inuence decisions at the district-level or
had discretion over the use of funds obtained from the district headquarters. Speccally,
the Law 22/1999 stipulated the creation of elected village councils (Badan Perwakilan Desa
or BPD) which, together with the village head, would decide the village budget (Antlov
2003). Upon approval at the village level, the village governing body would bring an annual
allocation plan of expenditures on local public goods to the district-level government for
approval and nancing. Chowdhury, Yamauchi, Dewina (2009) argue that the likelihood
of approval would depend on the level of nancial contribution at the village-level and the
availability of resources at the district-level. Antlov (2003) provides a case study of these
regulations in pratice based on observations in a village in West Java in 2001. The village
BPD approved a budget of Rp 80 million with funds allocated for regular infrastructure
development projects including road and irrigation improvements as well as funds to build
an o¢ ce for the BPD. It received a Rp 50 million grant from the district level government to
implement the budget and nanced the remainder from local revenues on house-tax, tolls,
and income from a marketplace.3 4
3In urban communities (kelurahan), Law 34/1999 stipulated the creation of dewan kelurahan, consultative
assemblies which had less power than the BPD in rural communities but a similar aim of improving democracy
and civic participation in public decision-making at the community-level (Okamoto 2014).
4It is worth noting that Law 22/1999 was followed by implementing regulations and decrees that poten-
tially a¤ected the role of village councils in practice across districts and over time. For example, Antlov (2003)
highlights that Ministerial Decision 64/1999 one of the rst implementing regulations of Law 22/1999 
provided guidelines for the new village institutions that, in a number of instances, contradicted or distorted
the spirit of the original law. Law 32/2004 was intended to provide clarity and address the contradictions
stemming from the original law (Duncan 2007). The new law moderated the role of the BDP in spending
decisions, making them consultative bodies to reduce potential conict with the village head, but retained
the original aim of strengthening village-level democracy. For example Article 209 of the law states that "the
Village Consultative Body endorses village regulations along with the village head in addition to accommo-
dating and channeling public aspirations". Thus, while Law 32/2004 may have shifted the balance of power
between the village head and the BPD, it retained the overall organisational structure that would enable
the village governing body to participate in local public spending decisions together with the district-level
government.
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One of the questions asked in the community survey of the 2007 IFLS is whether the
village government was involved in the construction of facilities and infrastructure by the
district government. Some level of involvement was reported in 82% of the villages (196 out
of 313), and involvement at the planning stage was reported in 63% of villages. Moreover,
in answer to the question who determines the village budget?, the village government was
reported as being the sole authority in 20% of cases (63 out of 313), and the village was
reported as being responsible alongside some higher-level administration in a further 25%
of cases (77 out of 313). Unfortunately a comparision with the year 1997 is not possible as
these questions were not asked in the earlier survey.
In the following sections, we investigate the impact of the shift in the source of revenues for
village governments on infrastructure development and social spending at the village level.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the average share of spending on physical
infrastructure (which includes roads, public transport and telecommunications) increased
substantially, from 6.5% to nearly 50% of the village development fund. The average share
of spending on social development, which includes education, health, community services
and womens development increased marginally from about 10% to 13%.
2.2 Village Institutions
The concept of adat laws or norms have played an important role in the understanding
of political, social and legal institutions in Indonesia at the community-level.5 The term
refers to customs, traditions, rules or practices that guide social life and decision-making
in Indonesian communities (Buttenheim and Nobles, 2009). They encompass a range of
matters in family and community a¤airs, including marriage, inheritence, dispute resolution,
mutual assistance activities and common property management (ibid; Kato, 1988; Bowen
1986; Warren and McCarthy 2002).
Adat lawwas recognised by the colonial administration in the Dutch Indies as part of a
dual legal system in which natives were subject to their own religious laws, institutions and
customs so far as they were not in conict with generally recognized principles of equity and
justice ... (Fasseur 2007). In an e¤ort to promote national unity, the post-colonial Suharto
regime took a more heavy-handed approach, and no political rights were allowed to follow
from cultural di¤erence or ethnic identity(Davidson and Henley, 2007: Chapter 1).
Notable among the administrative reforms undertaken by the Suharto regime was the
1979 Village Law, which introduced a uniform system of local governance throughout In-
donesia based on the administrative structure of Javanese villages (Kato, 1988). The main
components of the community government consisted of a village head (Kepala Desa), and a
5In the following discussion, we use the terms communityand villagesynonymously to refer to both
rural villages (desa) and urban communities (kelurahan) in Indonesia.
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Village Deliberation Council (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa or LMD) as the legislative body.6
A third component of community government, introduced through a Presidential decree in
1980, was the Village Cabinet (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or LKMD) which was
designed to assist the village head in planning and executing development projects. (Beb-
bington et al., 2006).
The village head e¤ectively selected the members of both these organisations and also
had the power to veto decisions made by the body. The village head, in turn, was legally
accountable to the district head rather than the community (Bebbington et al., 2006).
Over time, the new system of local governance introduced by the Suharto regime, includ-
ing administrative bodies at the district and community level, signicantly undermined the
authority of adat leaders and their ability to enforce adat rules (Kato 1988). Nevertheless,
adat law remained salient and relevant to rural life in Indonesia during the Suharto regime.
Based on the knowledge and information of a local expert, the Indonesian Family Life Sur-
veys (IFLS) classied all communities in terms of their adherence to adat laws. In nearly
80% of rural communities and 75% of urban communities, adat laws were reported to be
fearedand sometimes or almost never brokenin the 1997 survey. Using the same dataset,
Bandiera and Levy (2010) nd a strong correlation (73%) between community governance
according to adat law and current practice.
In the following years, Indonesia witnessed major economic and political changes, includ-
ing the East Asian Financial crisis, the end of the Suharto regime and the beginning of the
process of scal decentralisation. By 2007, adherence to adat laws appear to have declined
signicantly with 61% of rural communities and 45% of urban communities reporting that
they were fearedand sometimes brokenor almost never broken(see Table 2).
For the purpose of this paper, the relevant adat rules and laws are those that prescribe
community members to participate in collective activities requiring mutual cooperation. In
Table 3A, we present data from the IFLS which provides a snapshot of the nature and
range of these activities. As shown in the table, in about 85% of the surveyed communities,
there was, according to traditional law, at least one community group that relied on an
ethic of mutual cooperation for activities related to security, food security, health, educa-
tion, construction and infrastructure, and assistance to community members. In over 80% of
the communities, the traditional lawprescribed community activities to assist community
members in di¢ culty through disbursement of money, food or public service. Similar pro-
portions were reported for current practiceregarding these groups and activities.7 Thus, in
6Although the word villageappears in the names of these administrative o¢ ces, they applied to both
rural (desa) and urban (kelurahan) communities. In the literature on Indonesia, the word villagerefers to
the smallest o¢ cial administrative unit in both rural and urban areas.
7Relatedly, a 2004 survey conducted for the evaluation of the World Banks Second Urban Poverty Project
(UPP2), found that the level of participation among community (kelurahan) members in the construction of
public infrastructure was 47%, with 59% of respondents giving "tradition" or "obligation" as the main reason
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communities where adherence to adat laws was strong, community members were expected
to participate in, and could expect to benet from, a range of collective activities.
Communities which practise strong adherence to adat laws typically have weaker in-
frastructure, e.g. paved roads, public transport, and fewer facilities, e.g. banks, markets,
post o¢ ce, telecommunications o¤ce, etc. They are also more likely to be classied as rural
and located further from administrative headquarters at the district level. However, unlike
transport and communications infrastructure, the infrastructure for health and education in
adat communities is at par with, if not better than, that in non-adat communities (see Table
6).
Transport and communications infrastructure, it can be argued, would provide commu-
nity members greater opportunity to form economic and social links outside of the com-
munity. These would strengthen their outside options and thus, it has been argued in the
literature, weaken the ability of community leaders to enforce customary rules by punishing
violaters (Aldashev et al., 2012a, 2012b). As shown in Table 4, individuals who break the
adat rules of their community can face signicant penalties, including the payment of nes,
ostracism and even, in some cases, expulsion from the community. As expected, the penalties
are more severe in communities which practise stronger adherence to adat laws.
3 A Model of Cooperation in Collective Activities and
Adat Norms
3.1 Related Literature
One of the ways in which a group can ensure that its members adhere to a set of prescribed
rules in social and economic interactions is by excluding those who violate them, at least
temporarily, from the benets of group membership. This reasoning plays an important role
in theoretical explanations of the functioning of informal insurance groups (Kimball 1988,
Fafchamps 1992, Coate and Ravallion 1994); in which members of the group comply with
the rules of mutual insurance because they value the benets of being part of the group,
and the extent of mutual insurance in turn depends on the extent to which this insurance is
valued by its members.
Similar mechanisms have been proposed to explain the e¤ectiveness of joint liability credit
contracts in eliciting high repayment rates (Besley and Coate 1995), and contract enforce-
ment in the context of medieval trade (Greif 1993). According to this kind of reasoning,
the extent to which a group can enforce its rules of behaviour is a¤ected by the benets of
group membership, which in turn depends on the outside options that its members have.
for their participation. Furthermore, 37% of the cost of village public goods was covered by the community
members themselves. (Rao 2005).
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Consequently, as the outside options of the members improve, the ability of the group to en-
force its rules declines. Kranton (1996) develops a theoretical model of reciprocal exchange
(i.e. goods or services are given in exchange for future compensation in kind) where this
mechanism is in e¤ect: as markets develop, individuals have more opportunity to engage in
trade outside of informal, personalised exchange; the cost of social exclusion thus declines,
which in turn makes it more di¢ cult to sustain honest behaviour in reciprocal exchange.
Similary, Platteau (2006) has argued that social norms of informal insurance and commu-
nal land rights in traditional village communities become less e¤ective as market integration
provides outside opportunities to a rural population. Ho¤ and Sen (2005) explore the con-
sequences of this type of tension between informal, personalised exchange and market-based
exchange in the context of a kin system. They argue that the tension provides a kin group
the incentives to take collective action to restrict its members from migrating to the modern
sector even if doing so might raise aggregate welfare. Thus, the kin group can lead to a
kind of poverty trap. In the context of informal insurance, Wahhaj (2010) argues that the
insuring group will nd it in its interest to prescribe behaviour that restrict the ability of
its members to self-insure (such as a prescription of excessive consumption) as this increases
the value of the service provided by the insuring group and makes it easier to enforce the
rules of mutual insurance using a threat of social exclusion from the group.
Platteau (2000: Chapter 5) provides a survey of an ethnographic literature on a variety of
social norms and beliefs in traditional societies which make it costly for individuals to engage
in behaviour such as wealth accumulation which would make them less dependant on
solidary networks. Arguably, these norms and beliefs play the type of function suggested by
Ho¤ and Sen (2005) and Wahhaj (2010).
The theoretical contribution of the present paper is to extend the reasoning highlighted
above to the context of local public expenditures. Just as a kin group may wish to engage in
collective action which limits the outside options of its members, a community may choose,
collectively, to restrict the type of public investments that would enable its members to
engage better with the outside economy. Moreover, these incentives should be stronger
in communities that have more intra-community exchange to protect. If such incentives
are present, they should have implications for  and be apparent in  a process of scal
decentralisation. We explore these ideas formally in sections 3.2 to 3.4.
It should be noted that there is an existing theoretical literature on collective action and
the provision of public services, reviewed, for example, by Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan
(2007). This literature relates di¤erent characteristics of a group including group size, the
distribution of benets and cohesion within the group to the level of public goods provision,
compared to the rst-best level. Our approach is closest to that of Miguel and Gugerty
(2004), who argue that a group with stronger social networks has greater ability to impose
sanctions on group members who free-ride; and therefore should be able to generate a higher
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level of public goods. However, unlike this literature, we distinguish between public goods
which support interactions within communities and across communities, and relate group
solidarity to the type of public good provided.
3.2 Setup
Imagine a community consisting of nm members, divided into m groups of n individuals
each. They have the ability to engage in a collective activity which yields a good or service
for the community according to the following production function:
f (e) = A
Ym
j=1
 
nX
i=1
eij
!
where e = (e11; ::; en1; e12; ::; en2; ::; enm)
0 describes the amount of labour allocated to the
activity by each community member, A is a productivity parameter and  < 1
m
. This
production function is such that the labour contribution of individuals within the same
group are perfect substitutes but the labour contribution of individuals across groups are
not. The group categories may be men and women, the youth and elderly, etc.
The assumption that  < 1
m
means that the production function exhibits decreasing
returns to scale which is a reasonable assumption if the collective activity involves working
with a natural resource or other economic assets which is available in limited quantities.
Community members can also sell their labour on the market. The wage rate is w, but
individuals have to incur a transaction cost equal to  per unit of labour. The transaction
cost could involve transport costs or the cost of nding work which may be a¤ected by the
quality of road links and communications infrastructure. Community members also have
the means to purchase the good or service provided by the collective activity on the market
at a price p. Here again, they face a transaction cost equal to  per unit purchased.8 An
individual has a total of 1 unit of labour available that can be allocated between the collective
activity and the labour market. Thus, if an agent provides e units of labour to the collective
activity, and purchases Xm units from the market, then the agents budget equation is given
by
(p+ )Xm + Y  (1  e) (w   )
where Y is the level of monetary expenditures on other goods. We assume that the individual
has quasi-linear preferences, as represented by the following utility function:
U (X; Y ) = u (X) + Y
where X is the total amount of the good obtained either through the collective activity or
the market and u0 (X) ; u00 (X) < 0.
8For ease of notation, we assume that the transaction cost for the labour market and the goods market
are the same. But this has no bearing on the main insights of the model.
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There is an adat rule which specifes how much time each community member should con-
tribute to the activity, and the way in which its proceeds will be divided among community
members. For simplicity, we assume that the adat species the same labour contribution
and equal shares of the proceeds for all community members (however, our main results will
apply for more complex distributional rules as well). Let us denote the prescribed labour
contribution as eadat and let  = 1nm be the share of proceeds of the collective activity given
to each community member.
The game is innitely repeated and future consumption is discounted at a rate  per
period.
3.3 Contribution to the Collective Activity
Let us denote by efb (A;w; ) the e¢ cient level of contribution to the collective activity when
all community members contribute equally and obtain equal shares of the output. We obtain
efb (A;w; ) by solving the following optimisation problem.
max
e;Xm;Y
u (A (ne)m +Xm) + Y
subject to
(p+ )Xm + Y  (1  e) (w   )
Xm; Y  0
Using the rst-order conditions, we can show that if efb (A;w; ) 2 (0; 1), then the rst-
best level of contribution to the collective activity satises the following equation:
A (ne)m 1 u0 (A (ne)m +Xm) = (w   )
To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case where the two following conditions hold
(the precise parameter values for which these conditions hold are shown in the Theoretical
Appendix):
Condition 1 Each group is large enough that the marginal product of labour in the collective
activity for one community member is close to zero, given any level of e¤ort e > 0 by other
community members.
Condition 2 The price of the good X is su¢ ciently high such that an individual would not
purchase it on the market when it is being provided through the collective activity.
13
When Condition 1 holds, the marginal utility of contributing to the collective activity is
lower than the marginal utility of selling ones labour on the market and using it to purchase
other goods. Therefore, community members will not contribute to the collective activity
in the absence of any enforcement mechanism. How, then, can cooperation in the collective
activity be sustained? We take the approach that a community member who fails to make
the labour contribution prescribed by the adat rule is excluded from the future proceeds
from the collective activity. The discussion in the previous section and Table 3 shows that
there is su¢ cient evidence along these lines to justify such an approach.
Let us denote by (Xaut; Yaut) the consumption bundle enjoyed by an individual who has
been excluded from the collective activity. A community member i in group g who no longer
has access to the good produced through the collective activity would have to buy it from
the market. This person would also provide all her available labour on the market. That is,
the person would choose eig = 0. The utility maximisation problem for such an individual
can be written as
max
X;Y
u (X) + Y (1)
subject to
(p+ )X + Y  (w   ) (2)
X; Y  0 (3)
If the optimisation problem in (1) has an interior solution, then the following equation,
obtained from the rst-order conditions, must hold at the optimum:
u0 (X) = (p+ ) (4)
Combining the tangency condition in (4) with the budget equation in (2), we obtain a
unique solution for (Xaut; Yaut).
Let us denote by (Xadat; Yadat) the consumption bundle enjoyed by the community mem-
bers when everyone abides by the adat rules. If all community members follow the adat
rules, then the output from the collective activity is given by
f (eadat; ::; eadat) = A
Ym
j=1
 
nX
i=1
eadat
!
= A (neadat)
m
Each community member receives a fraction  of this output. Under Condition 2, the
community members do not purchase any quantity of good X from the market when they
receive a share of the proceeds from the collectivity. Therefore, Xadat = A (neadat)
m. They
are able to sell labour equal to (1  eadat) on the market and use their entire wage earnings
to buy good Y . Therefore, Yadat = (1  eadat) (w   ).
14
If a community member were to deviate from the adat rule, then she would not provide
any labour to the collective activity (due to Condition 1). This would provide the individual
extra earnings equal to (w   ) eadat. She would continue to enjoy the proceeds of the
collective activity in the current period (before being subject to social exclusion the next
period) and therefore, under Condition 2, will not use any of the extra earnings on good X.
The extra earnings are all spent on good Y . Also, by Condition 1, the loss in output from
the collective activity as a result of her deviation will be negligible. Therefore, she would
continue to enjoy a level of consumption of good X approximately equal to Xadat. Thus, the
utility gain from deviation is equal to
U (Xadat; w   )  U (Xadat; (1  eadat) (w   )) = eadat (w   ) (5)
However, the deviation will lead to social exclusion in subsequent periods. She will have
the autarkic consumption bundle (Xaut; Yaut) instead of the adat-based consumption bundle
of (Xadat; Yadat). This would translate into a utility loss of

1   [U (Xadat; Yadat)  U (Xaut; Yaut)] (6)
We assume that the community also has the means to impose additional punishment of
size 	 on those who deviate [this will be used primarily for comparative statics exercises
later on]. Using the expressions in (5) and (6), we can state that the level of cooperation
prescribed by the adat rule can be sustained if and only if
eadat (w   )  
1   [U (Xadat; Yadat)  U (Xaut; Yaut)] + 	 (7)
The left-hand side of (7) represents the gain from deviation from the collective activity.
The right-hand side represents the cost of social exclusion. Thus, the inequality provides an
upper-bound on the level of cooperation that can be sustained in the collective activity. Let
us denote this upperbound by e (A;w;  ;	).
An increase in A, which measures productivity in the collective activity, has no e¤ect on
the gain from deviation but raises the cost imposed by social exclusion. Therefore, raising
A would make it easier to sustain cooperation within the community; i.e. it would tend to
increase e (A;w;  ;	). A decline in the transaction cost  will tend to increase the gain from
deviation but lower the cost imposed by social exclusion. Therefore, lowering  will make it
more di¢ cult to sustain cooperation within the community.
Note that, by varying 	, we can allow communities to vary exogenously in terms of the
level of sustainable cooperation.Traditional adat rules would have prescribed a high level
of cooperation in the collective activity, but as access to markets improve, the value of
e (A;w;  ;	) will decline below the level originally prescribed. Thus, e (A;w;  ;	) can also
be regarded as a measure of the communitys adherence to traditional adat rules, with smaller
values corresponding to more relaxed adat rules. Formally, we can prove the following result.
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Proposition 1 Suppose 0 < e (A;w;  ;	) < efb (A;w; ) and Conditions 1 and 2 hold. The
highest possible level of cooperation in (i.e. labour contribution to) the collective activity is
increasing in  , the cost of market transactions and in A, the productivity of the collective
activity.
Proof. See Theoretical Appendix.
3.4 Optimal Choice of Investment in Public Infrastructure
Next, we investigate the optimal choice of investment in public infratructure across commu-
nities that vary in terms of the level of cooperation in collective activities and adherence to
adat rules. We distinguish between infrastructure and services that would (i) improve com-
munications and facilitate exchange with outsiders, such as public roads, public transport,
telecommunications and postal services; and (ii) facilitate communication and collective ac-
tivities within the community, such as meeting spaces, clubs, public services related to health
and education, etc. Both communal activities and market activities are likely to benet from
the two types of investment but it is reasonable to assume that the rst category of infrastruc-
ture is more benecial for market-based exchange with outsiders and that the latter is more
benecial to community activities.
For simplicity, we assume that there are just two types of public infrastructure, social
infrastructure denoted byKs and physical infrastructure denoted byKp. The productivity of
the collective activity A depends only on the level of social infrastructure and the transaction
costs of market exchange depends only on the level of physical infrastructure:
A = A (Ks) (8)
 =  (Kp) (9)
Assumption 1 A (Ks) ;  (Kp)  0 and A0 (Ks) > 0 and  0 (Kp) < 0 for all Ks; Kp  0.
The key implications of the model will remain valid if we allow both types of infrastructure
to a¤ect the value of both types of activity as long as (i) social infrastructure is relatively
more important for productivity in the collective activity compared to its e¤ect on market
transaction costs () and (ii) the opposite holds for physical infrastructure.
From the inequality in (7), it is evident that investing in social infrastructure will increase
the cost of social exclusion, and therefore increase the viability of cooperation in the collective
activity. On the other hand, investing in physical infrastructure will decrease transaction
costs of market-based exchange; therefore, it would decrease the cost of social exclusion and
make it more di¢ cult to sustain mutual cooperation in the community. These factors imply
that, in making public investment decisions, communities with di¤erent levels of cooperation
in the collective activity face di¤erent trade-o¤s.
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Formally, consider a community with an initial stock of physical instractureKp0 and social
infrastructure Ks0 and a pot of money B allocated for further infrastructural investments.
Given this setting, we can analyse what investment choices the community would make
to maximise the benet for the community members. The maximisation problem for the
optimal investment choice can be written as follows.
max
Is;Ip
U (A (Ks) (ne)
m ; (1  e) (w    (Kp))) (10)
subject to
Ks = Ks0 + Is, Kp = Kp0 + Ip
B  Is + Ip, Is  0, Ip  0
e = e (Ks; Kp;	)
where e (Ks; Kp; w;	) = e (A (Ks) ; w;  (Ks) ;	) represents the maximum sustainable level
of cooperation in a community with infrastructure (Ks; Kp) and exogenous punishment 	.
Using the maximisation problem in (10), we can establish the following result.
Proposition 2 For a community with a given level of initial infrastructure and budget, the
optimal choice of social investment is weakly increasing, and the optimal choice of physical
investment is weakly decreasing, in the initial level of cooperation (and 	) if Assumption 1
holds and the relative risk aversion exhibited by the function u (:) is smaller than 1.
Proof. See Theoretical Appendix.
The condition that the utility function u (:) exhibits relative risk aversion smaller than 1
in Proposition 2 is essentially a restriction on how quickly the marginal utility from the good
provided by the collective activity can decline: if the marginal utility declines too quickly,
then communities with a higher initial level of collective activity may prefer to invest more
in physical infrastructure rather than social infrastructure.
Note that Proposition 2 relates to the optimal choice of public investments by a commu-
nity. There are a number of reasons why the actual investment choices may not maximise
the welfare of community members. For example, if public spending decisions are made at a
higher administrative level, then investment choices may not take into account the adverse
e¤ects of improved market opportunities on cooperation in collective activities within the
community. On the other hand, in communities where there is local control over its public
spending decisions, and these decisions are made by consensus or by local o¢ cials who aim
to promote the collective interest of the community, we would expect the investment choices
to be closer to the optimum described in Proposition 2.
As described in Section 2, the Indonesian central government pursued a policy of mod-
ernisation and homogenisation during the Suharto regime. Therefore, we would not expect
17
the choice of public investments at the village level to vary systematically across communities
with high versus low levels of participation in collective activities during this perod (after
controlling for the existing level of infrastructure, etc.) The passage of the decentralisation
laws in Indonesia in 1999 substantially increased the control of village governments over
public investment decisions. On the basis of Proposition 2, we can argue that in communi-
ties with high levels of cooperation in collective activities and governance institutions more
conducive to e¢ cient outcomes, this shift in scal control should have increased the share of
public spending on social goods and decreased that on physical infrastructure relative to
communities where such governance institutions were absent or had low levels of participa-
tion in collective activities. This reasoning can be summarised in the following theoretical
prediction.
Prediction 1 For the subset of communities where governance institutions were conducive
to e¢ cient decision-making, those with higher levels of participation in collective activities
will invest a greater share of the budget on social investments and a smaller share on physical
investments, following the introduction of scal decentralisation (controlling for the initial
level of capital stock and the size of the available budget).
4 Econometric Model
We can test Prediction 1 using an econometric model as follows. Let ygit be the share of the
public good g (where g = s for social infrastructure and g = p for physical infrastructure)
in the total expenditures budget of community i in period t. Let Ksit and Kpit be the stock
of social and physical infrastructure respectively in community i in period t. Let Mit be a
measure of the extent of cooperation in collective activities in community i in period t. Let
Fit be a measure of control over scal spending at the community-level, and Dit a binary
variable indicating whether the community makes collective decisions through a democratic
process. Finally, let Xit be a vector of other characteristics of community i in period t. We
propose the following linear relationship between ygit and the other variables:
ygit = Xitx + sKsit + pKpit + mMit + dDit + fFit
+md (Mit Dit) + mf (Mit  Fit) + df (Dit  Fit)
+mdf (Mit Dit  Fit)
+i +  t + (i   t) + uit (11)
where x; b; s; p; md; mf ; df and mdf are parameters to be estimated. The term i
represents district xed-e¤ects,  t represents year xed-e¤ects and uit is an error term. The
error term captures other factors that may inuence the communitys spending decisions in
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period t. Our parameter of interest is mdf . According to Prediction 1, mdf + mf > 0 for
social investments and mdf + mf < 0 for physical investments.
The year xed-e¤ects capture changes due to any policies or economic shocks that im-
pacted all communities across Indonesia in the same manner. The district-level government
had an important role to play in public spending decisions at the village-level, particularly
after the introduction of scal decentralisation as discussed in Section 2. The district xed-
e¤ects and the district-year xed e¤ects (represented by the interaction term i t) capture
the e¤ects of unobserved common policies pursued by the district administration across com-
munities under its control within a given period (e.g., change of district boundaries), as well
as district-level time-varying shocks.
5 Identication Strategy
The scal decentralisation episode in Indonesia provides a convenient setting for testing the
theoretical predictions because, as discussed in Section 2, it brought about sharp changes in
the extent of local control over budgetary decisions within a span of a few years.
The parameter mdf represents a triple-di¤erence: the change in public spending shares
before and after scal decentralisation, di¤erenced across communities with and without
a tradition of democracy in local politics, then di¤erenced across communities with low
and high levels of particpation in collective activities. Our estimate of the impact of s-
cal decentralisation on local public spending is likely to be biased if the change in scal
control across communities was correlated with other unobserved community characteristics
with time-varying e¤ects on public spending decisions. Therefore, we need to nd instru-
ment(s) to focus on a particular source of variation in scal control across communities in
the post-decentralisation period uncorrelated with factors that had a direct e¤ect on public
investments at the community-level.
We instrument for local scal control using interaction terms involving a year-dummy and
variables measuring (i) the distance from the community to the district headquarters, and
(ii) the geographical size of the community. Arguably, communities situated closer to the
district headquarters had better access to and cultural or ethnic proximity with district-
level o¢ cials. These factors could faciliate access to district-level funds for projects initiated
at the community-level in the post-decentralisation period. The availability of funds can also
vary systematically by the size of the community in both the pre- and post-decentralisation
periods, with geographically larger communities more likely to have natural resources that
can be used to generate revenues. Both the distance and size variables are exogenous to
decisions made at the community-level and, barring a few exceptions, did not change in the
post-decentralisation period.9 To limit the possibility that these instruments proxy for other
9Some district demarcations changed between 1997 and 2007 but these boundaries are xed by the central
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community-level characteries, we also include controls for the communitys population, the
proportion of households in the community that are classied as being poor, whether the
community is rural, and whether it has access to the sea.
Thus, the rst-stage equation can be written as follows:
Fit = Xit1x + (Xit  d2007)1x +  1td2007 + 1i + (1i  d2007) + it (12)
where Xit is a vector of community-level characteristics including the geographic size of the
community and its distance from the district headquarters; d2007 is a dummy-variable which
takes a value of 1 in 2007 (thus indicating the post-decentralisation period in our sample)
and zero otherwise; and 1x and 1x are vectors of coe¢ cients to be estimated. We also
include district xed-e¤ects (1i), and their interactions with the year dummy d2007 for the
reasons given in the preceding section. Finally, it represents an i.i.d error term.
As noted in Section 2, following scal decentralisation, the central government provided
grants to di¤erent districts using a scal needsformula based on various district-level char-
acteristics. These factors would be invariant across communities within the same district
and, therefore, variations in the central government grant in 2007 stemming from the scal
needsformula would be subsumed in the district-year xed e¤ects.
Following the estimation of (12), we compute the predictedvalues of Fit using only
the 2007 dummy, the distance to the district headquartersand the community geographic
size variables. The predicted values replace Fit in (11) for the second-stage estimation.
We can then use (11) to obtain an unbiased estimate of mdf if the following two identify-
ing assumptions hold: (i) the level of participation in collective activities and democratic
decision-making within communities was not a¤ected by the scal decentralisation process;
(ii) the level of participation in collective activities and democratic decision-making are not
correlated with unobserved community characteristics (i.e. those not included in Xit) that
inuence the e¤ect of scal decentralisation on local public spending.10
The rst assumption is unlikely to hold: Pal and Roy (2014) show that the scal de-
centralisation in Indonesia had a signicant impact on local politics. To address this issue
of endogeneity, we take two measures. First, we use in our analysis only the subsample of
communities where the level of particpation in collective activities did not, in fact, change
over the period under consideration (1997 - 2007). Second, we use in our econometric model
a variable indicating whether the community had a tradition of democratic decision-making
rather than whether the current practice involves democratic decision-making. The former
is, by denition, exogenous to the process of scal decentralisation.
administration in Jakarta. Given these changes, the distance to district headquarters is a time-varying
variable for our sample of communities. Only 3 communities changed size between 1997 and 2007. While we
retain these communities for the subsequent analysis, dropping them does not materially change our results.
10Note that these identifying assumptions are akin to those required for the estimation of the e¤ect of
village elections and ethnic fractionalisation on village outcomes carried out by Padro-i-Miguel, Qian and
Yao (2013).
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We argue that the second identifying assumption is plausible given that we are able to
control for a range of important community characteristics (population poverty rate, whether
it is rural or urban, whether it is coastal) as well as all unobserved district level time trends
as captured by the district-year xed-e¤ects.
6 Data and Measurement of Variables
The empirical analysis uses community-level data obtained from the Indonesian Family Life
Survey (IFLS) data. In addition to household level data akin to that in the Living Stan-
dards Measurement Surveys, the IFLS provides very detailed information on communities
(alternatively labelled villages - desa or kelurahan). In particular, each round of the IFLS
contains information on 313 rural and urban communities drawn from 13 provinces including
Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east and south), Sumatra (north, west and south), Lampung,
West Nusa Tenggara and South Kalimantan (for further details on the data see Franken-
berg and Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al. 2009). Although the IFLS was conducted in 1993,
1997, 2000, 2007, only the IFLS rounds 1997 and 2007 contain information on communitys
adherence to adat laws and nature of governance. Therefore, we make use of the 1997 and
2007 rounds only. The choice of these rounds also ts our empirical strategy where we use
the introduction of scal decentralisation in 2001 as a natural experiment.
6.1 Local Fiscal Control
We measure local scal controlusing the share of the village government budget that came
from revenue transfers from the central government. As noted in Section 2, this share fell
from an average of 33% in 1997 to an average of 6.6% in 2007. This decline was compensated
by an increase in transfers from the district-level government; to the extent that a village
government had a say in infrastructure planning and budgetary decisions at the district
level, we argue that this represented an improvement in local scal control. Therefore, we
interpret a high value for the central governments share as indicating a low level of local
scal control and vice-versa. Specically, we dene a variable SHNCGOV as the proportion
of community revenues that does not come from the central government grant and use it for
Fit in equation (11).
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the source of revenues and share of spending
on di¤erent types of public goods in 1997 and 2007. It is evident that the share of the
funds received directly from the central government fell sharply following decentralisation;
however, this decline was accompanied by an increase in the share of the funds received from
the district-level governments.
We present a number of scatter plots to illustrate how the share of the central government
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grant in the village budget changed between 1997 and 2007. Figure 2 plots the share of the
central government grant in 2007 against the corresponding share for 1997. In 1997, the
shares are dispersed along the unit interval in a roughly uniform manner but in 2007, the
shares equal zero in a large number of communities. Thus, we have the share of the central
government grant dropping by di¤erent amounts across communities between 1997 and 2007,
with the drops being largest in communities which were heavily reliant on these grants in
the pre-decentralisation period.
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of the share of central government grant in the village
budget against the distance of the village from the district headquarters. The relationship
between the central government grant share and distance is roughly negative in 1997 but it
turns positive in 2007. In other words, communities situated closer to district headquarters
were relatively more reliant on central government grants in the pre-decentralisation period
but they became relatively less reliant following decentralisation. Figure 1a shows the cor-
responding scatter plot for the geographic size of the village. While there is no clear pattern
in 1997, it is clear that by 2007 the larger communities were more reliant on the central gov-
ernment grant. In the subsequent analysis, we exploit the shifts in the relationship between
the share of the central government grant and the village size and distance to headquarters
to identify the e¤ects of scal decentralisation on public goods investments.
6.2 Participation in Collective Activities and Adat Laws
Recall that, in the theoretical model, we distinguish between communities exhibiting high
and low levels of participation in collective activities. We posited that the adat rules specify
the nature and extent of the contribution that community members should make to collective
activities.
The IFLS data place each community into one of four possible categories: (i) traditional
laws are almost never broken; (ii) traditional laws are sometimes broken; (iii) traditional laws
are frequently broken and (iv) only a few people understand traditional laws. We classify
a community as an adat community if adat laws are almost never brokenand a non-adat
community otherwise. Overall, a smaller proportion of sample communities adhered strictly
to adat law in 2007 than in 1997 (see Table 2).
As described in Section 2, adat rules generally prescribe how each community member
should contribute to collective activities as well as the punishment for falling short of these
prescriptions. Therefore, we argue that communities where adat rules are generally ignored
or forgotten, cooperation in traditional collective activities are also weak. On the other
hand, communities where adat rules are adhered to, the level of cooperation in traditional
collective activities ought to be strong. In our analysis, we use the extent of a communitys
adherance to traditional adat rules as a measure of its (ability to sustain) cooperation in
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collective activities. This is captured by a binary variable ADAT that takes a value 1 if the
community strictly adheres to adat rules and 0 otherwise. For the empirical analysis, we use
this variable for Mit in equation (11).
The IFLS community questionnaire also includes a number of questions relating to mutual
cooperation. Respondents are asked whether there is an ethic of mutual cooperationwithin
the community and who participates in mutual cooperation activities. Moreover, there
are questions on whether there are community groups working on specied activities (e.g.
neighbourhood security, neighbourhood improvement, etc.). While the 1997 survey included
questions on both the traditional law and current practice relating to mutual cooperation
activities, the 2007 survey only had questions on the former. Therefore, these questions
do not provide a clear picture about the importance of collective activities within each
community in the year of the survey. Nevertheless, we use them to construct an alternative
measure of collective activities within the community, MUTUAL-COOP, which takes a value
of 1 if "according to traditional law" there is a community group for construction and
infrastructure projects and 0 otherwise.
Table 3 shows the correlation between the ADAT variable and the practice of mutual
cooperation activities in the survey communities. In 1997 communities for which ADAT =
1 were more likely to have mutual cooperation groups than communities for which ADAT
= 0, with the di¤erence being signicant for rural villages (desa). But there is a sharp rise
in mutual cooperation activities in both types of communities in 2007, and the di¤erences
in the rates of participation become statistically insignicant. This rise may be due to a
resurgence of values related to customary practices and adat laws observed since the start
of the decentralisation process in Indonesia (see Davidson and Henley 2007). As the classi-
cation based on adat laws are more stable across the two years than the classication based
on mutual cooperation activities, we regard it as a more reliable measure of participation in
collective activities at the community-level.
6.3 Governance
Using the IFLS data, we can classify communities according to the level of democratisation
in local governance. The 1997 and 2007 rounds of the IFLS included questions on the process
of selecting the community leader according to traditional law. Answers to this question are
coded as: (i) all residents engage in consensus building, (ii) local elites decide, (iii) decided by
local institutions, (iv) voting, (v) appointed by the government and (vi) other. We classify the
local polity as .democratic. if a leader is selected by free and fair elections with all community
members having the right to vote (codes (i) and (iv), and .oligarchic. if a leader is selected by
community elites (codes (ii), (iii) and (v)). The incidence of oligarchies potentially reects
the scope for elite capture. It is not clear how others.(code (vi) selected the local leader,
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and so we exclude these communities from our analysis. Using this data, we dene a binary
variable DEMOCRACY which takes a value of 1 for .democratic. communities and 0 for
oligarchic.communities. In the empirical analysis, we use this variable for Dit in equation
(11).
Table 5 summarises the information on the selection of community leaders across com-
munities in 1997 and 2007 using this classication. The data shows substantial di¤erences in
the selection process between the two years. However, as the question relates to the process
prescribed by traditional law, the variable should, by denition, be time-invariant. We at-
tribute the di¤erences in the data between the two rounds of survey to di¤erences in the
way the question may have been interpreted in the two years of the survey: the 1997 survey
included questions on both the current practice and the practice according to traditional law
while the 2007 survey included only the latter.
We consider the variable from the 1997 round as more reliable because of the distinction
it made between the current practice and the traditional law. Therefore, in our analysis, we
use only the 1997 variable as a single time-invariant indicator for whether the community
had a tradition of local democracy.11
6.4 Physical and Social Infrastructure
The aim of the paper is to examine how local institutions shape the provision of di¤er-
ent types of public goods. Therefore, we focus on a number of basic infrastructural goods
that could directly impact on sustainable livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, es-
pecially for the poor. The list of physicalinfrastructural goods we consider includes the
communitys access to cemented local roads , access to motorised public transport includ-
ing buses and boats, access to a public telephone o¢ ce, and access to a post o¢ ce. Local
roads and motorised public transport can subtantially reduce the disadvantages associated
with geographical isolation and remoteness and are, therefore, potentially important tools
for economic development and poverty alleviation. Similarly, the availability of public tele-
phone services and post o¢ ces could substantially reduce the disadvantages associated with
location and distance. Using principal components methods, we generate a composite in-
frastructural goods index consisting of the afore-mentioned physical infrastructural goods
(labelled PCINFRA). We compare these physical infrastructural goods with a communitys
access to two important socialgoods: namely, the number of government schools and health
centres per 100 community members.
Other community-level variables used in the analysis include the population and area of
11However, using the 2007 variable instead makes little di¤erence in the subsequent analysis. Our estima-
tion sample includes only communities for which adherence to adat laws did not change between 1997 and
2007. For this subsample, the value of the DEMOCRACY variable remains the same between in 1997 and
2007.
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the community, binary variables indicating whether it is rural and whether it has access to
the sea, and the distance of the community from the district headquarters. These variables
were all obtained from the IFLS community survey.
6.5 Public Spending
We aim to determine the spending composition of public investments in the sample commu-
nities, which is an important element for economic development policies (see, e.g., Aschauer
(1989), Barro (1991), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devrajan et al. (1996)).
The IFLS data provides details of the community budget and we use this information
to calculate the share of public spending that is allocated to di¤erent types of investment.
We classify (i) spending on education, health, community services and womens development
as social investmentsand (ii) spending on physical infrastructure and village enterprises
as physical infrastructural investments. The remainder of community public budget goes
to the maintenance of local infrastructure, the payment of salaries and other administrative
expenses. We construct variables SHSOC and SHINFRA dened, respectively, as the propor-
tion of total development spending on social goods, and the proportion of total development
spending on physical infrastructure. We use these variables for ysit and ypit respectively in
equation (11).
Figure 3 shows scatter plots of the share of public spending on social goods and physical
infrastructure, with the share of spending in 1997 on the horizontal axis and the share of
spending in 2007 on the vertical axis. The plots show that there was a good deal hetero-
geneity in spending shares in both years. But, importantly, most of the dots for spending
on physical infrastructure appear above the diagonal while most of the dots for spending
on social infrastructure appear below the diagonal, which means that the share spending
on physical infrastructure increased and that on social infrastructure decreased across most
communities between 1997 and 2007. This pattern is consistent with the descriptive statistics
in Table 1.
7 Results and Analysis
In this section, we present and analyse our results. The raw dataset contains complete
information for 311 sample communities. For the reasons explained in Section 5, we restrict
the sample to communities in which adherence to adat laws did not change between 1997 and
2007. This leaves us with an estimation sample of 195 communities (the level of adherence
changed in 116 communities). The regression sample is further restricted because of missing
observations in the left-hand side variables. The nal sample for the regression analysis
includes 159 communities and 233 observations (Tables 8, 9 and 10).
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Given the potential endogeneity of the share of the central government grant as a measure
of scal control, we focus our analysis on the instrumented xed e¤ects estimates of equation
(11). The rst stage estimates are shown in Table 7. The instrumented estimates of the
share of public spending on physical infrastructure and social infrastructure in Tables 8, 9
and 10. We cluster all standard errors at the community level to minimise the problem of
autocorrelation of errors over time within districts.
7.1 First-Stage Estimates for Fiscal Control
Our rst task is to nd a convincing instrument for the measure of communitys scal control.
To this end we rst obtain the district-level FE-OLS estimates of equation (12). We include
not only the set of explanatory variables (see section 5), but also a set of its interactions with
the year-dummy variable d2007 (which takes a value of 1 for the year 2007 and 0 otherwise).
In addition to our key identifying variables, namely, the distance of the community from
the district headquarters and the geographic size of the community, we include a number of
community characteristics including population, proportion of village households identied
as poor, and binary variables indicating whether the community is rural and whether it
has access to sea. The standard errors of the estimates are clustered at the district-level to
minimise the problem of correlation over time for a given district.
In Table 7, column 1 shows the estimates of SHNCGOV for the full sample while column
2 shows those for communities with stable adat. We focus our attention on the interaction
terms which represent the di¤erential e¤ects of various community characteristics after scal
decentralisation and nd that these estimates are generally stable across the di¤erent samples
that we consider.
While the share of the grant that is from the central government (in the community public
spending budget) fell across communities on average in 2007, the estimates indicate that the
decline was more muted in more rural, populous, and geographically larger communities.
The e¤ect of coastal location in 2007 is only signicant for the full sample (column 1), but
not in other subsamples.
The estimates indicate that, for communities further from the district headquarters, the
central government grant constituted a larger share of total revenues in 2007 (i.e. following
scal decentralisation). These estimates are consistent with the idea that communities closer
to the district headquarters had better access to funds from the district government and,
therefore, became less dependent on direct transfers from the central government following
scal decentralisation. Note that the corresponding coe¢ cient for the distance variable on
its own is close to zero and statistically insignicant in each specication. This suggests that
the variable is not serving as a proxy for other community-level characteristics that may
inuence transfers from the central government.
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The estimates also indicate that in geographically larger communities the central gov-
ernment grant constituted a smaller share of total revenues in 1999 but this relationship
e¤ectively disappears in the post-decentralisation period.
We test the relevance of the two instruments in determining the share of the central
government grant. The F-statistic for a joint test of signicance of the two instruments
(disdhq*2007 and vsize*2007) is 9.75 with a p-value of 0.001 (see Table 7), thus rejecting
the null hypothesis that neither instrument has an e¤ect in determining the share of central
grant.
We use the interaction of the estimated coe¢ cients of the distance and geographic size
variables and the year dummy to calculate the tted values for the share of the central gov-
ernment grant. The tted values are then used as the relevant community-level instruments
for the estimation of public spending shares on social and physical infrastructure at the sec-
ond stage, as laid out in equation (12). In doing so we also test the validity of the instrument
with a view to show that it is not correlated with the residual of various public spending
shares estimated at the second stage. These F-statistics for instrument validity are reported
in Tables 8, 9 and 10 (see further discussion below).
7.2 The Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation on Public Investments
In Tables 8, 9 and 10 we report IV estimates for equation (11), with Fit instrumented as
described in Section 5. Our baseline estimates are shown in columns 1-3 of Table 8, where the
governance variable used, DEMOCRACY, takes a value of 1 if the community in question
had a tradition of choosing its head on the basis of voting or a consensus decision among all
members of the community.
Recall that the share of the community budget not funded by central government, SHNC-
GOV, is our preferred measure of local scal control. Therefore, the e¤ect of scal decen-
tralisation can be represented by changes in this variable. In the regression, this variable,
on its own, has a statistically insignicant e¤ect on the share of investment in both social
and physical infrastructure. The coe¢ cient for social infrastructure, in particular, is close
to zero. In words, there is no evidence that, in communities that did not have a tradition
of democracy and did not practise strict adherence to adat norms, decentralisation had an
e¤ect on the proportion of public spending that went into investment in social or physical
infrastructure.
The coe¢ cient of the interaction term involving SHNCGOV and ADAT is negative and
statistically signicant in the case of total investment at the 1% level. The corresponding
coe¢ cients for social and physical infrastructure are also negative but statistically insigni-
cant. The interaction term for SHNCGOV and DEMOCRACY also has negative estimated
coe¢ cients for total investment, social infrastructure and physical infrastructure, although
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it is statistically signicant only in the rst two instances. Therefore, there is evidence that
scal decentralisation led to a decline in investment shares in communities that had either
a tradition of democracy or observed strict adherence to adat norms.
Finally, we turn to the triple-interaction term ADAT x DEMOCRACY x SHNCGOV.
There is a large, positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on both total investments and
investment in social infrastructure. This means that communities that had both a tradition
of democracy and observed strict adherence to adat norms experienced an additional e¤ect
from scal decentralisation, specically a strong increase in total investments and social in-
vestments.The corresponding e¤ect for physical infrastucture investments, although positive,
is statistically insignicant.
For the subset of communities with a tradition of democracy, those with strict adherence
to adat norms experienced a larger shift towards social investments.12 The corresponding
e¤ect for physical investments is negative but statistically insignicant.13 Assuming that
ADAT = 1 represent communities with a high levels of participation in collective activities
(as argued in Section 6), and communities for which DEMOCRACY = 1 make their invest-
ment choices optimally following decentralisation, these e¤ects can be checked against our
theoretical predictions. The greater shift towards social investments for ADAT communities
conforms to the theory. The theory also predicted a shift away from physical infrastruc-
tural investments by ADAT communities and, although the corresponding estimates are
statistically insignicant, the negative sign is consistent with this prediction.
At the bottom of the table, we provide results for tests on instrument relevance, instru-
ment validity and over-identication. We cannot reject the null that the over-identication
restrictions are valid, which suggest that the instruments do not have any direct e¤ects on
the outcome variables.
In Tables 9 and 10, we provide second-stage estimates for alternative measures of collec-
tive activities and local democracy within communities. Specically, in Table 9, we replace
the variable DEMOCRACY with CONSENSUS which indicates whether, according to tra-
ditional law, all residents engaged in consensus building to select the village head. The
estimated coe¢ cients, shown in columns 1-3 in Table 9, are less precisely estimated than
our previous set of results. The estimated coe¢ cients are smaller in size and statistically
insignicant. This suggests that the villages where the head is chosen by voting, as opposed
to consensus-building, may be important in driving the main results. In Table 10, we replace
ADAT with the variable MUTUAL-COOP which takes a value of 1 in communities where,
12The e¤ect is given by the sum of the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms DEMOCRACY x Govt Share
and DEMOCRACY x ADAT x Govt Share; i.e. 1.265 - 0.125 = 1.140 . An F-test for the null hypothesis
that the sum of the coe¢ cients is equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level (the F-statistic and p-value are
shown at the bottom of Table 8).
13The total e¤ect is 0.345 - 0.512 = -0.167, and this is insignicantly di¤erent from zero (F-statistic and
p-value shown at the bottom of Table 8).
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according to traditional law, there was a community group for construction/infrastructure
projects based on an ethic of mutual cooperation. The estimates are, broadly, in line with
our estimates using the ADAT variable. Communities which either practised mutual coop-
eration (in community groups for construction/infrastructure projects) or had a tradition
of democracy experienced a decline in the share of social investments, and a statistically
insignicant e¤ect on the share of physical investments. But communities which had both
a tradition of democracy and practised mutual cooperation experienced an additional shift
towards social investments (signciant at the 5%) and away from physical infrastructural
investments (signicant at the 10% level).
We show the FE-OLS estimates of (11) in columns 4-6 of Tables 8 and 9. The estimated
coe¢ cients of the interaction terms involving SHNCGOV are similar to those obtained using
the IV approach but the point estimates are generally smaller. Note that changes in SHC-
GOV between the two time periods are potentially endogenous, particularly as the transfer
of funds from the central government in the post-decentralisation period was based on a
scal needs formula(see Section 2) based on community characteristics such as population,
geographical size, poverty rate, etc. To the extent that these same community characteristics
directly a¤ected public investments following decentralisation, our FE-OLS estimates of the
impact of scal decentralisation would be biased. The FE-IV estimation addresses this issue
by excluding, at the second-stage, the part of the variation in the central government grant
share which is correlated with these characteristics.
8 Concluding Comments
Improving the quality of public services available to the masses is, potentially, an important
tool for poverty alleviation in developing countries; and the potential role of scal decentral-
isation in this process has been discussed extensively in the literature (World Bank 2004a).
Since decentralisation provides greater decision-making power to local governments, its im-
pact on public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the quality and nature of local
institutions.
With this motivation, this paper investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the
impact of scal decentralisation on local public spending in communities in Indonesia using
two rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Surveys. Specically, we explored how scal
decentralisation a¤ects the share of public spending on goods which facilitate communication
and exchange with outsiders (collectively called physical infrastructure) and health and
education (collectively called social goods) across communities which di¤er in terms of
their adherence to traditional laws and tradition of local democracy.
We developed a theoretical model to show that if mutual cooperation in collective activ-
ities within communities are sustained by the threat of social exclusion, then the optimal
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choice of investment in infrastructure that faciliate exchange with outsiders is, ceteris paribus,
lower in communities where the existing level of cooperation is higher. In the context of scal
decentralisation in Indonesia, we derived the theoretical implication that communities with
strong adherence to adat laws which promote an ethic of mutual cooperation and prescribe
social sanctions against those who engage in deviant behaviour would allocate a greater
share of public spending on social investments and a smaller share on physical infrastructural
investments relative to other communities.
Our empirical analysis shows that the e¤ect of scal decentralisation on public spending at
the community-level is heterogenous. Fiscal decentralisation led to a decline in investments
as a share of total public spending in communities that had either a tradition of democracy
or observed strict adherence to traditional laws. However, communities which had both
a tradition of democracy and adhered to traditional laws experienced a sharp increase in
investments which more than o¤sets the decline noted above.
For the latter communities, we also nd that decentralisation led to a shift in public
spending towards investment in social goods, with no signicant change in the share going
into investments in communications and road infrastructure, which provides partial support
for the theory.
These results highlight the role of heterogeneous institutions (both formal and informal)
on public spending patterns following the introduction of scal decentralisation.
9 Theoretical Appendix
Condition 1: We derive below the parameter values for which Condition 1 holds: Suppose
that all community members, except individual l in group k contribute a level of e¤ort equal
to e. Then we obtain
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Therefore, for any " > 0, and eij = e for all ij 6= lk, 9n0 such that for n > n0, @f@elk < ".
Condition 2: We derive below the parameter values for which Condition 1 holds: Sup-
pose that e is the prescribed level of e¤ort in the collective activity. Then the level of
provision of good X through the collective activity is given by
f (e) = A (ne)m
Then, if an individual i spends all his labour earnings on good Y , his level of consumption
of good X is simply his share of the proceeds of the collective activity: A (ne)m.
Then the marginal utility for individual i per unit of money spent on good X is given by
u0 (X)
p+ 
=
u0 (A (ne)m)
p+ 
And the marginal product per unit of money spent on good Y is
v0 (Y ) = v0 ((1  e) (w   ))
Therefore, individual i would not make any expenditures on X if and only if
v0 ((1  e) (w   ))  u
0 (A (ne)m)
p+ 
Proof. of Proposition 1: If e (A;w;  ;	) < efb (A;w; ), then we must have the condition
in (7) holding with equality at e = e (A;w;  ;	):
(1  ) e (w   ) =  [U (Xadat; Yadat)  U (Xaut; Yaut)] + (1  ) 	 (14)
Furthermore, we must have, at e = e (A;w;  ;	),
(1  ) (w   ) >  mnA (ne)m 1 u0 (A (ne)m)  (w   ) (15)
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If (15) did not hold, then increasing e marginally above e (A;w;  ;	) would increase the
cost of social exclusion by more than it would raise the gain from deviation. This would
imply that a level of cooperation above e (A;w;  ;	) is sustainable, which contradicts the
denition of e (A;w;  ;	).
Taking the derivative throughout (14) w.r.t.  , we obtain, at e = e (A;w;  ;	),
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The numerator on the right-hand side of (16) is positive by construction. The denominator
on the right-hand side of (16) is positive because of the condition in (15). Therefore, we
obtain @e
@
> 0.
Similarly, taking the derivative throughout (14) w.r.t. A, we obtain, at e = e (A;w;  ;	),
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The numerator on the right-hand side of (17) is positive by construction. The denominator
on the right-hand side of (17) is positive because of the condition in (15). Therefore, we
obtain @e
@A
> 0.
Proof. of Proposition 2: Consider a community where the initial level of infrastructure is
represented by the parameters Ks0 and Kp0 and the exogenous punishment for violating the
adat norm is equal to 	. Let us denote by
 
Is ; I

p

the optimal investment choice in this
community for a specied budget B, as dened by the maximisation problem in (10). By
construction, the maximum sustainable level of e¤ort in the collective activity following such
an investment choice is equal to e
 
Ks0 + I

s ; Kp0 + I

p ; w;	

.
Taking the derivative of the maximand in (10) w.r.t. Is and Ip we obtain, respectively,
the following expressions:
dU (:)
dIs
= A0 (Ks) (ne)
m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) (1  
)
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where Ks = Ks0 + Is and Kp = Kp0 + I

p and 
 =
u0(:)A(Ks)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 1 (w (Kp))
u0(:)A(Ks)(ne)m 1 (w (Kp))= . It can be
shown that if the utility function u (:) exhibits relative risk aversion less than 1, then d
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and d
de
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m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)] > 0.14 It follows that d
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Let us denote by Is (Ks0; Kp0;	) and I

p (Ks0; Kp0;	) the solution to the optimisation
problem in a community with exongenous punishment 	. If 	0 > 	 then, using Proposition
1 and Assumption 1, e (Ks; Kp;	0) > e (Ks; Kp;	) for any Ks; Kp > 0. Therefore, if the
optimisation problem has an interior solution in the case of the community with exogenous
punishment 	, we must have dU(:)
dIs
> dU(:)
dIp
at Is = Is (Ks0; Kp0;	) and Ip = I

p (Ks0; Kp0;	)
for a community with exogenous punishment 	0. Therefore, the optimal choice of investment
will involve a higher value of Is and a smaller value of Ip in the latter community.
Suppose the optimisation problem has a corner solution in the case of the community
with exogenous punishment 	, such that Is (Ks0; Kp0;	) = 0. Then
dU(:)
dIs
< dU(:)
dIp
at Is =
Is (Ks0; Kp0;	) and Ip = I

p (Ks0; Kp0;	) in this community. Given the signs of the cross-
partial derivatives provided above, we must have dU(:)
dIs
 dU(:)
dIp
or dU(:)
dIs
> dU(:)
dIp
at Is =
Is (Ks0; Kp0;	) and Ip = I

p (Ks0; Kp0;	) for a community with exogenous punishment 	
0.
In the rst case, we obtain the identical corner solution. In the second case, the optimal
choice of investment will involve a higher value of Is and a smaller value of Ip in the latter
community. Reasoning along the same lines, we can make the necessary argument if the
corner solution in community 	 is such that Ip (Ks0; Kp0;	) = 0.
14To obtain the second result, note that
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It follows that if relative risk aversion is smaller than 1 then
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To obtain the rst result, note that
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The denominator in this last expression is negative according to the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1
while all the terms in the numerator are positive. Therefore, d
de < 0.
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TABLES 
Table 1. Changes in Community Revenues and Public Spending 1997-2007 
Variables 1997 2007 Variables 1997 2007 
 Mean (sd) Mean (sd)  Mean (sd) Mean (sd) 
Share of spending [1] on  
    Social Infrastructure 0.1078 (0.1153) 0.1284 (0.1955) 
Total spending (‘000 
Rp) [3] on 
Social Infrastructure 
 
 
164 (318) 
 
 
1057.2 (2633) 
    Physical infrastructure 0.0658 (0.0839) 0.4992 (0.3691) Physical infrastructure 75.1 (135.4) 1540 (2659) 
Share of revenues [2] from 
 
Central Government 
 
 
0.3291 (0.3119) 
 
 
0.0663 (0.1745) 
Total revenue ((‘000 
Rp) [3] from  
Central Government 
 
 
67.32 (164.3) 
 
 
146.6 (528) 
Provincial Government 0.1444 (0.2920) 0.1345 (0.2681) Provincial Government 135.16 (376) 673.8 (2086) 
District Government 0.0911 (0.1877) 0.4066 (0.3479) District Government 2214 (63.37) 523.3 (898.4) 
Local Funds 0.3786 (0.3781) 0.3925 (0.3256) Local Funds 235.5 (726) 2393.7 (100961) 
Note: [1] Total community spending includes spending on new investment (social and physical infrastructure), maintenance of local public goods 
and also that on paying salaries and transfers. [2] Total community revenue is generated from grants from central, provincial and district 
governments and also funds raised from local communities. The remaining balance is accounted for by various governmental transfers under 
different development programmes. All nominal variables are measured at 2010 price level.  
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Table 2. Adherence to Adat laws across Rural (desa) and Urban (kelurahan) Communities 1997-2007 
 1997 (% of total communities) 2007 (% of total communities) 
 Rural 
(desa) 
Urban 
(kelurahan)   
Rural 
(desa) 
Urban  
(kelurahan) 
Adat laws are never broken 38.41 24.81 28.69 21.63 
Adat laws are sometimes broken 40.58 51.13 35.25 23.56 
Adat laws are frequently broken 1.45 3.76 9.84 20.67 
Only a few understand Adat laws  19.57 19.55 26.23 34.13 
Note: Percentages are based on responses to questions in the community questionnaire in IFLS2 and IFLS4 regarding the 
extent to which community members follow adat laws. 
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Table 3A: Practice of Mutual Cooperation and Collective Activities within Communities, 1997 
 
traditional law current practice 
 frequency % frequency % 
Community Activity  conducted 
on a routine basis 200 73.8% 203 74.9% 
Community Groups that use 
Principle of Mutual Cooperation 233 86.0% 229 84.5% 
… for security 20 7.4% 16 5.9% 
… food security 3 1.1% 3 1.1% 
… health, education, economy 44 16.2% 50 18.5% 
… construction/infrastructure 69 25.5% 68 25.1% 
… assist community member 82 30.3% 73 26.9% 
… other 15 5.5% 16 5.9% 
Community Activity for 
assisting members in difficulty 223 82.3% 223 82.3% 
N 271   271   
Note: Figures are based on responses to the following questions in the Adat 
module of the IFLS2 community survey: “Is there a community activity (or 
organization) that is conducted on a routine basis that was formed by 
members of this village?”, “Are there community groups in this village that 
utilize the principle of mutual cooperation?”, and “What is the main purpose 
of this activity?” The subcategories "security", "food security", etc. refer to 
community groups that carry out those activities and use an ethic of mutual 
cooperation.  
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Table 3B. Practice of Mutual Cooperation across Adat and non-Adat Communities 1997-2007 
 1997 
% of communities with mutual 
cooperation groups 
2007 
% of communities with mutual 
cooperation groups 
 ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat 
Desa 94.23 76.47 2.5350** 100 100 - 
Kelurahan 93.93 88.66 0.8691 100 0.9421 1.6339 
 1997 
% of communities with coop groups for 
community infrastructure 
2007 
% of communities with coop groups for 
community infrastructure 
 ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat 
Desa 41.51 27.06 1.7684* 95.40 91.43 0.8492 
Kelurahan 18.18 13.53 0.6764 95.56 89.02 1.3235 
Note: Mutual cooperation groups refer to community groups that make use of an ethic of ‘mutual 
cooperation’ for various collective activities relating to security, health, education, infrastructure 
projects, assisting community members in difficulty, etc. See Bowen (1986) for further information. 
The signs *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4. Sanctions for breaking Adat Rules, 2007 
 Adat Communities   Non-Adat Communities 
 Frequency %   Frequency % 
No Sanctions 14 18.4  85 34.8 
Minor Sanctions  29 38.2  109 44.7 
Major Sanctions  33 43.4  50 20.5 
Total 76 100  244 100 
Note: ‘Major Sanctions’ include fines, ostracism, social exclusion and corporal 
punishment. ‘Minor Sanctions’ include giving advice. 
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Table 5. Method of Selection of Community Leaders 1997-2007 
 All Communities 
 1997 2007 
 Rural (Desa) Urban (Kelurahan) Rural (Desa) Urban (Kelurahan) 
Consensus 38 53 15 18 
Voting 64 50 100 78 
Oligarchy 18 89 5 96 
Total 120 192 120 192 
 Stable Adat Communities 
 1997 2007 
 Rural (Desa) Urban (Kelurahan) Rural (Desa) Urban (Kelurahan) 
Consensus 23 26 17 32 
Voting 41 27 38 30 
Oligarchy 4 36 5 35 
Total 68 89 63 97 
Note: We use information on the method of selection of leaders in 1997 and 2007 to classify 
communities into three types: ‘consensus building’ among community members, ‘voting’ and 
‘oligarchies’ where the leader is elected by the local elite (religious or legal leaders) or government 
officials.  
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Table 6. Inter-Community Variation in Public Goods Provision 
 1997: Full sample 2007: Full sample 
Variables Adat communities non-Adat communities t-stat 
Adat 
communities 
non-Adat 
communities t-stat 
Access to bus services 0.18 0.31 -2.3428** 0.29 0.34 -0.7985 
Access to paved roads 0.71 0.84 -2.6038** 1.00 0.94 0.8034 
Public telephone office 0.32 0.58 -4.2565*** 0.71 0.77 -0.9906 
Access to a post office 0.15 0.31 -2.7917** 0.16 0.28 -2.0745** 
Government schools   
    per 100 people 2.15 1.41 2.2371** 
1.52 1.42 0.3448 
Government health facilities 
    per 100 people 1.07 0.51 2.5505** 
1.84 1.82 0.0827 
Share of public spending on  
    physical infrastructure 0.068 0.065 0.2371 
0.48 0.51 -0.4187 
Share of public spending on  
    social infrastructure 0.13 0.11 0.7331 
0.14 0.13 0.2377 
 1997: Stable Adat 2007: Stable Adat 
Variables Adat communities non-Adat communities t-stat 
Adat 
communities 
non-Adat 
communities t-stat 
       
Access to bus services 0.18 0.33 -1.4070 0.36 0.37 0.1098 
Access to paved roads 0.68 0.87 -2.2868** 0.99 1 0.5046 
Public telephone office 0.36 0.60 -2.1362** 0.55 0.82 -2.9463*** 
Access to a post office 0.23 0.33 -0.967 0.09 0.34 -2.3603** 
Government schools   
    per 100 people 1.82 1.32 0.9135 
1.60 1.20 -0.812 
Government health facilities 
    per 100 people 1.30 1.01 1.111 
1.95 1.73 0.5476 
Share of public spending on  
    physical infrastructure 0.05 0.07 -0.6479 
0.32 0.50 1.4201 
Share of public spending on  
    social infrastructure 0.15 0.11 1.2474 
0.33 0.13 2.8511*** 
Note: The signs *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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Table 7. First-Stage Estimates for Share of Revenues Not Provided by the Central Government 
 
 (1) (2) 
 All  Stable Adat 
VARIABLES SHNCGOV SHNCGOV 
   
Distance from DHQ 0.00173 -0.00491 
 (0.00141) (0.00317) 
Log(Popn) 0.119*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0322) 
Log(Size) 0.0193 0.0436*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0154) 
Rural  0.108** 0.102 
 (0.0523) (0.0607) 
Sea  0.129*** 0.121* 
 (0.0460) (0.0685) 
% of Poor Households 0.0126 -0.0184 
 (0.0395) (0.0505) 
Year 2007 1.345*** 1.466*** 
 (0.248) (0.288) 
Year07*Distance from DHQ -0.00335** -0.00506** 
 (0.00162) (0.00205) 
Year07*Log(Popn) -0.0870*** -0.0809** 
 (0.0319) (0.0369) 
Year07*Log(Size) -0.0248* -0.0605*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0212) 
Year07*Rural   -0.172*** -0.146** 
 (0.0607) (0.0707) 
Year07*Sea -0.120** -0.115 
 (0.0552) (0.0693) 
Year07*Poor(%) Dropped Dropped 
   
Constant -1.679*** -1.789*** 
 (0.204) (0.268) 
District FE Yes Yes 
District*Year FE Yes Yes 
Instrument relevance[1]: F (p-val) - 9.75 (0.001)*** 
Communities 305 191 
Observations 515 320 
R-squared 0.378 0.425 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
DHQ stands for District Head Quarter. 
[1] Instrument relevance was tested for H0: (year07*disdhq = 
Year07*log(size) = 0) after the first stage regression. 
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Table 8. District FE Estimates of Spending Shares on Public Investment Using Democracy & Stable Adat Communities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IV estimates Non-IV estimates 
VARIABLES Total Invest SHINFRA SHSOC Total Invest SHINFRA SHSOC 
SHNCGOV IV 0.474 0.508 -0.034    
 (0.290) (0.324) (0.192)    
Adat  0.546** 0.364 0.181 0.342 0.305 0.037 
 (0.212) (0.250) (0.151) (0.320) (0.407) (0.245) 
Democracy 0.444*** 0.319** 0.125 0.193** 0.057 0.136* 
 (0.120) (0.143) (0.100) (0.089) (0.086) (0.071) 
Adat*Democracy -1.160*** -0.386 -0.774** -0.601 -0.309 -0.292 
 (0.262) (0.464) (0.387) (0.380) (0.479) (0.334) 
Adat*SHNCGOV IV -0.875** -0.589 -0.287    
 (0.346) (0.378) (0.222)    
Democracy*SHNCGOV IV -0.636*** -0.512** -0.125    
 (0.171) (0.212) (0.127)    
Adat*Democracy*SHNCGOV IV 1.610*** 0.345 1.265**    
 (0.384) (0.655) (0.544)    
SHNCGOV    0.196* 0.123 0.073 
    (0.112) (0.119) (0.075) 
Adat*SHNCGOV    -0.551 -0.460 -0.091 
    (0.405) (0.465) (0.270) 
Democracy*SHNCGOV     -0.319** -0.191 -0.128 
    (0.124) (0.129) (0.086) 
Adat*Democracy*SHNCGOV    0.885* 0.196 0.689 
    (0.498) (0.595) (0.436) 
Constant 0.314 0.516 -0.203 0.559 0.610 -0.050 
 (0.544) (0.534) (0.307) (0.503) (0.487) (0.282) 
Communities 159 159 159 159 159 159 
Instrument validity[1]: F (p-value) 1.62 (0.20) 1.46(0.23) 0.97(0.32)    
F stat [2] 9.53*** 1.17 4.57**    
Over-id test[3]:Chi-sq (p value) 12.3 (0.01) 13.4(0.00) 13.6 (0.005)    
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.12 0.17 0.64    
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.648 0.613 0.251 0.657 0.630 0.280 
Other control variables are community population, size, distance from district head quarter, if rural, community’s access to sea, share of poor 
households and also initial stock of physical infrastructure, government schools and government health centres. We also include district, year and 
(district*year dummies). [1] We test whether the instrument is correlated with the second stage regression residuals respectively in columns (1)-
(6). [2] A test of the theoretical prediction: H0: (Adat*SHNCGOV IV + Adat*Democracy *SHNCGOV IV) = 0. [3] Test of over-identification: 
We use Hansen J-test and report the p-value. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9. District FE Estimates of Spending Shares on Public Investment Using Consensus & Stable Adat Communities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IV estimates Non-IV estimates 
 Total Invest SHINFRA SHSOC Total Invest SHINFRA SHSOC 
SHNCGOV IV  0.112 0.144 -0.032    
 (0.261) (0.283) (0.193)    
Adat  -0.304 0.258 -0.561** -0.199 0.323 -0.522** 
 (0.186) (0.265) (0.264) (0.180) (0.202) (0.215) 
Consensus 0.109 0.004 0.105 0.045 -0.051 0.096 
 (0.182) (0.195) (0.122) (0.110) (0.108) (0.106) 
Adat*Consensus 0.030 -0.188** 0.218** 0.081 -0.277*** 0.359*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.108) (0.101) (0.106) (0.124) 
Adat*SHNCGOV IV 0.338 -0.443 0.781**    
 (0.269) (0.371) (0.364)    
Consensus*SHNCGOV IV -0.268 -0.079 -0.188    
 (0.245) (0.260) (0.143)    
Adat*Consensus*SHNCGOV IV 0.006 0.222 -0.216 0.130 0.283* -0.153 
 (0.176) (0.187) (0.173) (0.145) (0.157) (0.140) 
SHNCGOV    -0.026 -0.035 0.008 
    (0.061) (0.057) (0.046) 
Adat*SHNCGOV    0.140 -0.428* 0.568** 
    (0.209) (0.220) (0.236) 
Consensus*SHNCGOV    -0.192 -0.029 -0.162 
    (0.138) (0.145) (0.121) 
Constant 0.494 0.686 -0.192 0.620 0.743 -0.122 
 (0.510) (0.526) (0.292) (0.484) (0.477) (0.278) 
Communities 159 159 159 159 159 159 
IV validity[1]: F (p-value) 1.17 (0.28) 1.13 (0.29) 1.34 (0.25)    
F stat [2] 4.82** 1.02 2.47*    
Over-identification test[3]       
Chi-square (p value) 2.7 (0.26) 2.64(0.26) 2.63 (0.27)    
Hansen J-stat – p-value 0.68 0.75 0.35    
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.637 0.601 0.262 0.657 0.629 0.284 
Other control variables are community population, size, distance from district head quarter, if rural, community’s access to sea, share of poor 
households and also initial stock of physical infrastructure, government schools and government health centres. We also include district, year and 
(district*year dummies). [1] We test whether the instrument is correlated with the second stage regression residuals respectively in columns (1)-
(6). [2] A test of the theoretical prediction: H0: (Adat*SHNCGOV IV + Adat*Consensus *SHNCGOV IV) = 0. [3] Test of over-identification: We 
use Hansen J-test and report the p-value. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10. District FE IV Estimates of Spending Shares on Public Investment Using Mutual Cooperation & Stable Adat Communities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total invest Physical invest Social invest 
 
SHNCGOV IV 0.319 0.040 0.279 
 (0.293) (0.306) (0.182) 
Mutual-Coop 0.078 -0.185 0.263* 
 (0.162) (0.210) (0.155) 
Democracy 0.314** 0.004 0.310*** 
 (0.148) (0.181) (0.103) 
Mutual-Coop* Democracy -0.109 0.389 -0.498** 
 (0.249) (0.296) (0.221) 
Mutual-Coop*SHNCGOVIV -0.070 0.309 -0.378** 
 (0.225) (0.283) (0.178) 
Democracy*SHNCGOV IV -0.427** -0.018 -0.408*** 
 (0.207) (0.267) (0.156) 
Mutual-Coop*Democracy*SHNCGOV IV 0.009 -0.649* 0.658** 
 (0.316) (0.386) (0.265) 
Constant 0.270 0.534 -0.265 
 (0.545) (0.539) (0.340) 
Instrument validity[1]: F (p-value) 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 
F-test[2] 0.06 (0.81) 1.62 (0.20) 2.41 (0.10)* 
Over-identification test[3]    
Hansen J-stat – p-value 0.54 0.46 0.62 
Communities 159 159 159 
Observations 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.637 0.595 0.163 
Other control variables are community population, size, distance from district head quarter, if rural, 
community’s access to sea, share of poor households and also initial stock of physical infrastructure, 
government schools and government health centres. Key explanatory variable Mutual-Coop takes a 
value 1 if all members participate in mutual cooperation activities for the construction of public 
infrastructure. We also include district, year and (district*year dummies). [1] We test whether the 
instrument is correlated with the second stage regression residuals respectively in columns (1)-(6). [2] 
A test of the theoretical prediction: H0: (Mutual-Coop*SHNCGOV IV + Mutual-Coop*Democracy 
*SHNCGOV IV) = 0. [3] Test of over-identification: We use Hansen J-test and report the p-value. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Regression Variables for Communities with Stable Adat 
Variable Definitions Mean Std. Dev. 
SHINFRA Share of total community spending on new road, transport, etc. 0.2610 0.3276 
SHSOC 
Share of total community spending on new schools, health 
centres. 0.1359 0.1782 
Total investment Sum total of physical and social investment 0.4048      0.3263 
Central Grant Share of community’s total revenue from central grants 0.1759 0.2766 
Adat 1 if the community strictly adheres to adat law 0.125 0.3313 
Mutual-Coop 
1 if all members participate in mutual cooperation activities for 
the construction of public infrastructure. 0.5062 0.5003 
Democracy 1 if the leader is elected by voting or consensus building 0.8602 0.3473 
Consensus 1 if the leader is elected by consensus building 0.2885     0.4534 
Physical infrastructure 
A composite index of community’s access to bus, paved road, 
po, pto,…using principal components analysis 0.0558 1.0205 
Govt schools per 100 people Number of government schools per 100 popn 1.4136 2.5354 
Govt health centres per 100 
people 
Number of govt health centres (puskesmas, posyandu etc) per 
100 popn 1.4116 1.1677 
Community population Natural logarithm of community population 8.7998 0.9297 
Community size Natural logarithm of community’s geographic area 5.5204 1.6494 
Rural 1 for desa and 0 for keluharan 0.4265 0.4955 
Sea 1 if the community has access to sea 0.6985 0.4597 
Distance from district head 
quarter 
Distance of the community in km from the district head 
quarters 4.5435     8.9813 
Poor Fraction of total community households who are  poor  0.2426 0.4295 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1. Scatterplots of Share of Central Government Grant as a function of Village distance 
from District Headquarters 
 
 
All Communities 
 
All Communities 
 
 
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Note: The figures show scatter plots of the share of the central government grant in total revenues against 
log(1+Distance to District Headquarters) in 1997 and 2007 for (i) all communities and (ii) communities 
for which adherence to adat laws did not change between the two years. 
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Figure 1a. Scatterplots of Share of Central Government Grant as a function of Village Size 
 
 
All Communities 
 
All Communities 
 
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Note: The figures show scatter plots of the share of the central government grant in total revenues against 
log(Community Size) in 1997 and 2007 for (i) all communities and (ii) communities for which adherence 
to adat laws did not change between the two years. 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots of Share of Revenue from Local Funds and Central Government in 2007 as 
a function of that in 1997 
 
 
Local funds, All Communities 
 
Local funds, Stable Adat Communities 
 
Central Gov’t. Grant, All Communities 
 
Central Gov’t. Grant, Stable Adat Communities 
 
Note: The figures show scatter plots of the share of (a) community revenues and (b) central government 
grant in total revenues in 2007 against that in 1997 for (i) all communities and (ii) communities for which 
adherence to adat laws did not change between the two years.
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Figure 3. Scatter plots of Spending Shares in 2007 against that in 1997 
 
 
Spending on Social Goods, All Communities 
 
Spending on Physical Infrastructure,  
All Communities 
 
Spending on Social Goods, 
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Spending on Physical Infrastructure,  
Stable Adat Communities 
 
Note: The figures show scatterplots of the share of total spending in (a) social goods and (b) physical 
infrastructure for (i) all communities and (ii) communities for which adherence to adat laws did not change 
between the two years.  
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